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he new government of Greece had to make a choice between staying in the eurozone 
and accepting the programme imposed by its creditors. Last Friday the choice was 
made. Greece chose to remain a member of the euro area and asked for a temporary 
extension on the existing programme with the aim of finding out what flexibility might be 
available to his country. There will certainly be flexibility to change some of the hundreds of 
detailed structural reform measures the previous government signed up to. But the one area 
where the new Finance Minister, Yanis Varoufakis, might be able to claim success is fiscal 
policy.   
The Greek government had insisted all along that it would be unreasonable to demand a 
primary surplus of 4% of GDP from Greece (for 2015), and Mr Varoufakis had proposed an 
upper limit of 1.5% of GDP. His euro-area colleagues were visibly amused. Many of them 
already run larger primary surpluses today; and those European countries that did succeed 
in reducing their debt levels in the past, did so by running primary surpluses of 4% of GDP 
for over a decade (notably Belgium, Ireland and Sweden). 
However, Greece’s partners have understood that the raw numbers of the primary surplus 
have to be seen in the context of the very depressed state of the Greek economy. In terms of 
the budget adjusted for the state of the economy, Greece seems to be in a special situation. 
The statement of the Eurogroup of February 20th (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ 
en/press/press-releases/2015/02/150220-eurogroup-statement-greece/) acknowledges this 
by stating: “The institutions will, for the 2015 primary surplus target, take the economic 
circumstances in 2015 into account.”  
This makes sense, but adjusting the fiscal balance for the effects of the cycle is more of an art 
form than a science. Reasonable people can disagree on all the elements that go into 
estimates of the so-called ‘cyclically-adjusted budget balance’. This was recognised a long 
time ago, which explains why the European Commission was appointed as the official 
referee for the cyclical adjustment of fiscal balances. Its latest estimates are summarised in 
the table below. 
                                                   
1 The expression was coined by Yanis Varoufakis, the new Greek Finance Minister. It was intended to 
shock, but one needs to look beyond the headline numbers bandied about by the main protagonists to 
judge whether he was justified in using such provocative language. 
T
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Table 1. Cyclically adjusted budget balances as % of GDP  
(based on the Commission’s potential GDP estimates) 
Cyclically Adjusted Primary Balance 
Country Change 2010-14 2014 
Euro area 3.9 1.6 
Germany 3.6 2.7 
Greece 10.2 6.7 
Spain 6.1 1.0 
Italy 2.8 4.0 
Portugal 10.2 2.9 
Data source: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/eu/forecasts/2015_winter_forecast_en.htm 
Looking at the entire programme period (2010-14), one could thus argue that Greece 
underwent a wrenching fiscal adjustment, worth over 10% of GDP in four years. However, 
as shown in the table, Portugal, which is even poorer than Greece, had the same fiscal 
adjustment, also over 10% of GDP in four years, and could thus also claim to have been 
‘fiscally waterboarded’.2  
However, Greece can claim to be in a unique situation in terms of the primary balance 
achieved today. On a cyclically adjusted basis, it stood at 6.7% of GDP, in 2014 (preliminary 
data though) – four percentage points higher than in Germany and much higher than in the 
other peripheral countries.  
In reading these numbers, one must keep in mind that in calculating the adjustment for the 
cycle, the Commission compares actual GDP to its own estimate of potential GDP. Here 
Greece’s numbers are again unique. According to the estimates of the Commission, Greek 
potential GDP has fallen by about 18% since the crisis (and continues to fall by about 2% per 
annum), much more than in the other programme countries. This explains why the output 
gap is estimated to fall to 6% of GDP this year while unemployment remains stuck above 
20%. 
This astonishing estimate of the fall in potential is not due to a special methodology. The 
Commission applies a common methodology that has been agreed with national authorities. 
But this black box gives numbers that do not accord with common sense when fed with 
Greek numbers. One could thus argue that the black box might need some tinkering to make 
sense of Greece, but this would open a Pandora’s box as many other member states would 
argue “why not me too?”. 
A reasoned analysis of the fiscal effort undertaken by the Greek authorities so far must come 
to the conclusion that, given the state of the economy, fiscal policy is indeed exceptionally 
tight; and that more attention should be given to the primary surplus relative to the state of 
the economy. It will remain impossible to pin down the exact size of the output gap and 
hence some judgment will have to be applied. Some relaxation of the near-term primary 
surplus targets, agreed when financial markets were in a state of crisis, seems appropriate 
given the depressed state of the Greek economy and the fact that the long-term cost of 
                                                   
2 The improvement in Greece’s overall budget balance amounts was larger than that of the primary balance 
because the debt-service burden went down by about 2.5% of GDP, thanks to the PSI operation and the 
generous interest rates on Greece’s official loans. The opposite was the case for Portugal, whose interest 
costs went up, which implies that it will have to make a larger effort in terms of the primary balance to 
reach the same overall improvement in the fiscal balance. 
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refinancing public debt is now close to zero throughout the euro area. But the Greek 
government should also recognise that, once economic conditions normalise, primary 
surpluses on the order of +/-4% of GDP will be appropriate. 
The cyclical adjustment of budget balances comes from the same basic idea as the GDP-
linked payments proposed recently by Mr Varoufakis. Linking the fiscal effort to the state of 
the economy is a sound concept. But the devil is in the details, and the concept should be 
used to distribute the effort better over time, not to wriggle out of it. 
